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I. INTRODUCTION
The number of claims against attorneys continues to increase in South
Carolina. Until recently, attorney malpractice claims were generally brought
only by clients, and the theories of liability most commonly sounded in
negligence and breach of contract.' Third parties were discouraged from
presenting attorney malpractice claims because of strict privity requirements.2
* Partner in the firm of Holmes & Thomson in Charleston, South Carolina; B.A. Skidmore
College; M.A. University of Houston; J.D. University of Puget Sound.
** Associate in the firm of Holmes & Thomson in Charleston, South Carolina; B.A. Temple
University; J.D. Rutgers University.
1. See, e.g., Floyd v. Kosko, 285 S.C. 390, 391, 329 S.E.2d 459,460 (Ct. App. 1985) (per
curiam). In Floyd a client brought an action against his attorney for breach of contract,
negligence, and "professional malpractice" arising out of attorney's defense of the client in a
medical malpractice action. In a footnote to the decision, the court noted that it discerned no
difference between the causes of action for negligence and professional malpractice. Id. at 391
n.1, 329 S.E.2d at 460.
2. See, e.g., Gaar v. North Myrtle Beach Realty Co., 287 S.C. 525, 528-29, 339 S.E.2d
887, 889 (Ct. App. 1986) ("In his professional capacity the attorney is not liable, except to his
client and those in privity with his client, for injury allegedly arising out of the performance of
his professional activities."); see also Mark O'Neill, Privity Defense in Legal Malpractice Cases:
1
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Today, the claimants and the theories are far more wide-ranging.
This article reviews the current status of common law claims against
attorneys for breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, abuse of process, and
malicious prosecution. It further addresses possible statutory claims under the
South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Acte and the Frivolous Civil Proceed-
ings Sanctions Act.' In addition, this article analyzes the differences between
the standard of competence required under the South Carolina Rules of
Professional Conducte and the standard of care applicable in a legal malprac-
tice action.
II. BREACH OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
South Carolina courts have long recognized that attorneys owe a fiduciary
duty to their clients. In the early case of Wise v. Hardin6 the South Carolina
Supreme Court compared the role of an attorney to that of a trustee:
In all matters, either of contract or gift, between attorney and client, from
the confidential relation which must necessarily exist between them, the
law requires not only proof of fairness on the part of the former, but the
influence which their relative position allows him to exercise demands that
severe and rigorous fairness which can leave nothing of doubt or
uncertainty behind.7
The court has also described the fiduciary connection between attorney
and client as a "trust relationship."8 This relationship is not only recognized
at common law, but also is incorporated into the Rules of Professional
Conduct, thereby exposing an attorney to possible disciplinary action for its
breach.9
South Carolina is not alone in holding attorneys accountable as fiduciaries
to their clients. In one way or another, courts in every jurisdiction have held
that attorneys owe a fiduciary obligation to their clients.'" Like the courts
The Citadel Still Stands, 54 DEF. COUNS. J. 511, 517-19 (1987) (discussing the privity defense
to legal malpractice claims).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to -560 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1993).
4. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-36-10 to -50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
5. S.C. APP. CT. R. 407.
6. 5 S.C. 325 (1874).
7. Id. at 328-29, quoted in In re Jacobson, 240 S.C. 436, 449, 126 S.E.2d 346, 353 (1962)
(per curiam).
8. See Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Chandler, 226 S.C. 94, 105, 83 S.E.2d 745,750 (1954)
("Attorneys occupy a trust relationship to their clients and agreements between them, as between
trustees and cestuis, are examined with utmost care by the courts in order to avoid any improper
advantage to the attorney.").
9. See, e.g., In re Green, 291 S.C. 523, 525, 354 S.E.2d 557, 558 (1987) (per curiam).
10. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMrH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 11.1, at 631 (3d
[Vol. 45:851
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in South Carolina, other courts cite the client's trust and confidence in the
attorney as the basis for the fiduciary obligation.1
The duty of a fiduciary in South Carolina is to act in "good faith" with
respect to the interests of the one reposing confidence.' 2 What constitutes
good faith has not been fully defined, in large part because the duty is
equitable in nature, 3 and the courts have therefore been unwilling to set any
precise description that might limit its application.' 4
A. Standard of Conduct v. Standard of Care
Because the fiduciary duty of attorneys is so loosely defined, at first
glance it is difficult to distinguish the fiduciary duty from the general standard
of care owed by attorneys in the performance of their professional services. 15
The general standard of care encompasses a requirement to act in good faith
toward the client. 16 Although both duties require the attorney to act in good
faith, the fiduciary duty has been referred to as a standard of "conduct," as
opposed to a standard of "care."' 7
ed. 1989 & Supp. 1993).
11. See id.
12. O'Shea v. Lesser, 308 S.C. 10, 15, 416 S.E.2d 629, 631 (1992) (citing Island Car Wash,
Inc. v. Norris, 292 S.C. 595, 358 S.E.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1987)).
13. Although the fiduciary duty is equitable in nature, a cause of action for damages stemming
from a breach of the fiduciary duty is an action at law. Bivens v. Watkins, _ S.C. _, 437
S.E.2d 132, 133 (Ct. App. 1993). However, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty may still sound
in equity if the relief sought is equitable in nature. Id. at _ n.3, 437 S.E.2d at 133 n.3. The
court's finding in Bivens is consistent with the general rule that the rights asserted and the form
of relief sought determine whether an action is one at law or in equity. Dean v. Kilgore, _
S.C. _, 437 S.E.2d 154, 155 (Ct. App. 1993); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 874 cmt. b (1977) ("Mhe remedy of a principal against an agent [for breach of a fiduciary
duty] is ordinarily at law.").
14. See Island Car Wash, Inc., 292 S.C. at 599, 358 S.E.2d at 152 ("Courts of equity have
carefully refrained from defining the particular instances of fiduciary relationship in such a
manner that other and perhaps new cases might be excluded and have refused to set any bounds
to the circumstances out of which a fiduciary relationship may spring.") (quoting 36A C.J.S.
Fiduciary 385 (1961)).
15. The general standard of care in professional negligence actions is set forth in Doe v.
American Red Cross Blood Servs., 297 S.C. 430, 377 S.E.2d 323 (1989) (per curiam), where
the South Carolina Supreme Court stated: "[I]n a professional negligence cause of action, the
standard of care that the plaintiff must prove is that the professional failed to conform to the
generally recognized and accepted practices in his profession." Id. at 435, 377 S.E.2d at 326.
16. See Folkens v. Hunt, 290 S.C. 194, 200, 348 S.E.2d 839, 843 (Ct. App. 1986)
("[Professionals must] 'render their services with that degree of skill, care, knowledge, and
judgment usually possessed and exercised by members of that profession... in accordance with
accepted professional standards and in good faith without fraud or collusion.'") (quoting Russel
L. Wald, Annotation, Accountant's Malpractice Liability to Client, 92 A.L.R.3D 396, 400
(1972)).
17. MALLEN & SMrrH, supra note 10, § 11.1, at 633. See generally Deborah A. DeMott,
1994]
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In the past, claims for breach of fiduciary duty were seldom made in
South Carolina. When such claims were presented, they generally involved
allegations against attorneys who had defrauded or taken advantage of their
clients for personal gain 8 or had otherwise failed to show their clients
undivided loyalty." However, in the last few years, plaintiffs in legal
malpractice suits have asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty almost as
a matter of course, regardless of the nature of the attorneys' alleged error or
omission.
One explanation for the increased number of breach of fiduciary duty
claims may be the perceived availability of punitive damages under such a
theory. Although no state court decisions have been reported in South
Carolina, courts in other jurisdictions have held that a client may recover
punitive damages if the attorney breaches a fiduciary duty in a willful, wanton,
or malicious manner.20 However, courts have not allowed punitive damages
when the attorney's breach of the fiduciary duty was not willful or mali-
cious. 21
The fact that breach of a fiduciary duty has been regarded as constructive
fraud in South Carolina" should not alter the punitive damages analysis
because malice or intent is not an element of constructive fraud.' In fact,
lack of intent distinguishes constructive fraud from actual fraud.24 It has
Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DuKE L.J. 879 (1988) (discussing
the general principles of fiduciary obligation).
18. See, e.g., Hawley v. Jennings, 148 S.C. 140, 145 S.E. 697 (1928) (holding attorney liable
to client when the attorney received $7,000 for selling the client's land, but told the client he
received only $5,500 and kept part of the difference).
19. See, e.g., In re Conway, 305 S.C. 388, 409 S.E.2d 357 (1991) (per curiam) (holding that
disbarment was appropriate sanction for attorney's misconduct in appropriating funds from
corporation that the attorney had formed with a client).
20. See, e.g., Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 523 F. Supp. 744, 773-74
(D.D.C. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 680 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Finch v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 469 A.2d 867, 896 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 469 A.2d 864 (Md.), and
cert. denied, 475 A.2d 1200 (Md. 1984), and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Fillion v.
Troy, 656 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
21. See, e.g., Roebuck v. Steuart, 544 A.2d 808, 816 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Albright
v. Bums, 503 A.2d 386, 391 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986).
22. See, e.g., Designer Showrooms, Inc. v. Kelley, 304 S.C. 478, 480-81, 405 S.E.2d 417,
419 (Ct. App. 1991).
23. In Greene v. Brown, 199 S.C. 218, 19 S.E.2d 114 (1942), the South Carolina Supreme
Court defined constructive fraud as "a breach of a legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of
the moral guilt of the fraud feasor, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive
others, to violate public or private confidence, or to injure public interests." Id. at 223, 19 S.E.2d
at 116 (quoting C.J.S. Fraud § 4, at 1060 (1921)).
24. Designer Showrooms, 304 S.C. at 480-81, 405 S.E.2d at 419. Punitive damages are
available in an action for actual fraud because the tortfeasor was conscious, or chargeable with
consciousness, of his wrongdoing. See Carter v. Boyd Constr. Co., 255 S.C. 274, 283, 178
4
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generally been held that punitive damages are not available under a construc-
tive fraud theory.'
B. The Privily Issue
Unlike an attorney's legal duty of care, which extends both to the client
and to "those in privity with the client,"26 the equitable fiduciary duty
traditionally extends only to the client.27 Under South Carolina law, "[a]
person attains the status of a 'client' when that person seeks legal advice by
communicating in confidence with an attorney for the purpose of obtaining
such advice."2" Persons who meet this definition have standing to pursue a
claim for an attorney's breach of the fiduciary duty.
In Hotz v. MinyarY9 the South Carolina Supreme Court apparently
created a limited exception to the privity rule. The plaintiff in Hotz sued the
attorney who prepared her father's will.30 Although the plaintiff was not the
attorney's client with respect to the will, the court held that the attorney owed
the plaintiff a fiduciary duty based on the "special confidence" she placed in
the attorney.
31
Not surprisingly, Hotz has encouraged third party actions against
attorneys for breach of the fiduciary duty. Third party claimants have argued
that Hotz represents a departure from the strict privity requirement that would
otherwise prevent them from bringing such a claim in attorney malpractice
actions. However, a more detailed review of the facts in Hotz reveals that the
plaintiff was not a traditional third party, but instead had an ongoing attorney-
S.E.2d 536, 540 (1971) (citing Young v. Goodyear Serv. Stores, 244 S.C. 493, 137 S.E.2d 578
(1964)).
25. See MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 10, § 11.3, at 640.
26. Gaar v. North Myrtle Beach Realty Co., 287 S.C. 525, 529, 339 S.E.2d 887, 889 (Ct.
App. 1986). Under South Carolina law, there is no bright line test to determine whether privity
exists at law between two parties. Richburg v. Baughman, 290 S.C. 431, 434, 351 S.E.2d 164,
166 (1986). Instead, privity is determined on a case-by-case basis. See First Nat'l Bank v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 207 S.C. 15, 26-27, 35 S.E.2d 47, 57-58 (1945). Generally,
privity will be found when a party is "so identified in interest with another that he represents the
same legal right." Id. at 27, 35 S.E.2d at 58 (quoting 30 AM. JUR. Judgments § 225, at 957
(1940)).
27. See Pierce v. Lyman, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236, 241 (Ct. App. 1991) (quoting MALLEN &
SMrrH, supra note 10, § 11.2, at 638-39).
28. Marshall v. Marshall, 282 S.C. 534, 539, 320 S.E.2d 44, 47 (Ct. App. 1984) (citing In
re Colocotronis Tanker Sec. Litig., 449 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
29. 304 S.C. 225, 403 S.E.2d 634 (1991).
30. Id. at 229, 403 S.E.2d at 636.
31. Id. at 230, 403 S.E.2d at 637. Although a fiduciary duty exists when a party reposes
special confidence in another, the duty cannot be created unilaterally. The party in whom the
confidence is placed must be aware of that confidence. See Burwell v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank,
288 S.C. 34, 41, 340 S.E.2d 786, 790 (1986).
1994]
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client relationship with the attorney.32 Although the attorney did not
represent the plaintiff regarding the specific will that was at issue in the case,
he had previously represented the plaintiff in a number of legal matters. In
fact, the attorney had prepared the plaintiff's taxes for over twenty years and
had drafted a will for her that she signed only one week before the transaction
at issue.33 Furthermore, the plaintiff was the vice-president and minority
stockholder in one of her father's businesses.34 Thus, the attorney's continual
and current representation of the plaintiff was necessarily interrelated with his
representation of her father and the family businesses. The plaintiff considered
that the defendant was her attorney, and she had consulted with him on various
matters regarding the family businesses. In addition, the plaintiff was a named
beneficiary under her father's will, and the court held that the attorney owed
her a limited duty not to "actively misrepresent" the contents of that will. 5
Apparently, Hotz is a fact-driven decision that represents, at best, a
narrow exception to, rather than a departure from, the strict privity require-
ment. Therefore, it may be concluded that the South Carolina courts will
continue to look for the attorney-client relationship as the foundation for a
breach of fiduciary duty claim in a legal malpractice action.
III. BREACH OF ETHICAL RULES
An attorney sued for legal malpractice may also face related disciplinary
charges. All records and proceedings concerning the disciplinary charges are
strictly confidential36 and, therefore, cannot be raised as an issue in a legal
malpractice action. It is not uncommon, however, for a claimant in a legal
malpractice suit to argue that the South Carolina Rules of Professional
Conduct37 define an attorney's duty of care and may be used at trial to
establish the attorney's breach of a legal duty.
A. The Use of the Rules in Malpractice Actions
The Preamble to the South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct
contains language that calls into serious question a claimant's attempt to use
the Rules in a legal malpractice suit, whether for purposes of pleading or
proof:
32. Hotz, 304 S.C. at 230, 403 S.E.2d at 637.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 227, 403 S.E.2d at 635.
35. Id. at 230, 403 S.E.2d at 637.
36. S.C. ApP. CT. R. 413, 20. Violation of Rule 413 is deemed contempt of court, Id.
20(E), and in the case of attorneys, is grounds for disciplinary action. See In re Cheek, 303 S.C.
280, 281, 400 S.E.2d 139, 140 (1991) (per curiam).
37. S.C. App. CT. R. 407.
[Vol. 45:851
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Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor
should it create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The
Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a
structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are
not designed to be a basis for civil liability. Furthermore, the purpose of
the Rules can be subverted when they are invoked by opposing parties as
procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer's
self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of
a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral
proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule.
Accordingly, nothing in the Rules should be deemed to augment any
substantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplinary consequences of
violating such a duty.
38
The Preamble specifically states that the Rules are not intended as a basis
for civil liability and that a claimant cannot seek to enforce the Rules through
a civil suit. Furthermore, the Preamble warns against the danger inherent in
invoking the Rules as a procedural weapon in a civil suit and specifies that the
Rules do not give rise to a presumption equating violation of a Rule with the
breach of a legal duty. Therefore, the clear language of the text leads to the
inescapable conclusion that the South Carolina courts should not allow
claimants in legal malpractice suits to base their allegations of breach of a
legal duty on the Rules or use the Rules as evidence of breach of a legal duty.
The limitation on a claimant's use of the Rules is further suggested in the
recent case of Langford v. State,39 in which the South Carolina Supreme
Court rejected a criminal defendant's argument that his conviction was
rendered unconstitutional by virtue of his attorney's possible violation of the
South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct.4" The court stated that the
purpose of the Rules is "to regulate and guide the legal profession by defining
proper ethical conduct. . . . Therefore, Langford implies that the South
Carolina courts will not allow the Rules to be used as evidence of a breach of
care in a legal malpractice suit.
In Hizey v. Carpenter42 the Washington Supreme Court analyzed at
length the issue of the use of the Rules of Professional Conduct in a legal
38. S.C. App. CT. R. 407, Scope. The cited language appears verbatim in the scope to the
American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Compare MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Scope (1992) with S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, Scope.
39. __ S.C. __, 426 S.E.2d 793 (1993).
40. Id. at 426 S.E.2d at 795.
41. Id. at __, 426 S.E.2d at 795 (citing S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, Scope); see also Cianbro
Corp. v. Jeffcoat & Martin, 804 F. Supp. 784, 790 n.9 (D.S.C.) ("[The South Carolina Rules
of Professional Conduct] are not designed to be a basis of civil liability.") (quoting S.C. APp.
CT. R. 407, Scope), aff'd, 10 F.3d 806 (4th Cir. 1993) (table).
42. 830 P.2d 646 (Wash. 1992).
19941
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malpractice suit. 43 The court expressly distinguished between a legal duty of
care and breach of an ethical Rule, recognizing that the Rules of Professional
Conduct were never intended as a basis for civil liability. The court held that
the jury in a legal malpractice case may not be informed of the Rules through
either expert testimony or jury instructions, because an ethical violation is not
actionable at law and the introduction of the Rules could mislead the jury into
concluding that the Rules conclusively establish the legal standard of care.'
The position that the ethical rules do not establish the standard of care in
a civil action for legal malpractice is consistent with the fact that the attorney
disciplinary system bears limited resemblance to the civil justice system. The
ethical rules are designed to guide attorneys in their dealings with both clients
and the courts,4' whereas the civil justice system is designed to compensate
those who suffer injury at the hands of another.46
Procedurally, an attorney's breach of an ethical rule is addressed under
special disciplinary rules47 established by the South Carolina Supreme Court,
which are subject to somewhat relaxed rules of evidence.4" Conversely, in
43. Id. at 650-54.
44. Id. at 654; see also Hendricks v. Davis, 395 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot alone support a legal
malpractice action) (citing Roberts v. Langdale, 363 S.E.2d 591 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)), overruled
on other grounds, Hardaway Co. v. Amwest Sur. Ins. Co., 436 S.E.2d 642 (Ga. 1993);
Helmbrecht v. St. Paul Insurance Co., 362 N.W.2d 118, 127-28 (Wis. 1985) (indicating that the
Code of Professional Responsibility does not define standards for civil liability of attorneys). But
see Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924, 936 (6th Cir.) (holding that, under Tennessee law, the
Code of Professional Responsibility constitutes "some evidence of the standards required of
attorneys"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); Rogers v. Robson, Masters, Ryan, Brumund &
Belom, 392 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (holding that the Code of Professional
Responsibility is a relevant consideration in a legal malpractice case), aff'd, 407 N.E.2d 47 (I11.
1980); Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (Mass. 1986) ("[I]f a plaintiff can
demonstrate that a disciplinary rule was intended to protect one in his position, a violation of that
rule may be some evidence of the attorney's negligence."); Martinson Bros. v. Hjellum, 359
N.W.2d 865, 875 (N.D. 1985) (holding that alleged violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility constituted evidence to be considered by the trier of fact in a legal malpractice
action).
45. See S.C. APp. CT. R. 407, Preamble ("A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer
of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.").
It has therefore been suggested that the legal system itself is "the party most involved in and
affected by the professional standards of the Model Rules." Jean E. Faure & R. Keith Strong,
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct: No Standard For Malpractice, 47 MONT. L. REV. 363,
375 (1986). Faure and Strong argue that allowing use of the ethical rules in a legal malpractice
case would cause attorneys to "distance themselves from the court system and consider more
important their relationship with clients than their relationship with the legal system." Id. at 375.
46. Cf. Ex Parte Lewie, 17 S.C. 153, 155 (1882) (describing the Court of Common Pleas as
a "general fountain of justice" for citizens whose rights have been invaded).
47. S.C. APP. CT. R. 413 (Disciplinary Procedure).
48. See id. 24(A) ("Unless otherwise directed and subject to the policy stated by this Rule,
[Vol. 45:851
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civil cases strict rules of evidence apply, 49 and the cases are conducted as
adversarial proceedings. Furthermore, the South Carolina Supreme Court may
impose a wide range of sanctions for an ethical violation,"0 depending upon
the mitigating and aggravating circumstances involved.51 A civil fact-finder,
on the other hand, may only award money damages as compensation for an
injury proximately suffered. 2
Prohibiting the use of ethical Rules as evidence of the attorney's duty of
care in a legal malpractice case is also consistent with the broad aspirational
nature of the Rules.53 Although some of the Rules prescribe or prohibit
the rules of civil procedure and rules of evidence apply in disciplinary cases.").
49. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 43 (Evidence; Conduct of Trial).
50. S.C. APP. CT. R. 413, 7(A) (Manner of Discipline) states:
Every member of the Bar found guilty of misconduct shall be disciplined in
accordance with the seriousness of such misconduct by:
1) disbarment;
2) suspension for an indefinite period . . ., subject to reinstatement only as
hereinafter provided;
3) temporary suspension for a definite period .... such period of suspension
to be fixed by the Court, not to exceed two years;
4) public reprimand;
5) private reprimand.
In addition, the South Carolina Supreme Court has used the disciplinary system as a vehicle
for issuing instructive guidelines or warnings to the Bar. See, e.g., In Re Anonymous Member
of the S.C. Bar, 297 S.C. 527, 530, 377 S.E.2d 573, 574 (1989) (per curiam) (stating in a
private reprimand: "We call to the bar's attention .... [that] we will no longer excuse unwitting
violations of the rule [requiring confidentiality of grievance proceedings].").
51. See S.C. App. Cr. R. 407, Scope ("ITihe Rules presuppose that whether or not discipline
should be imposed for a violation, and the severity of a sanction, depend on all the circumstanc-
es, such as the willfulness and seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether there
have been previous violations."). For specific examples of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances considered in disciplinary actions, see In re Woodruff, _ S.C. _, 438 S.E.2d
227, 228 (1993) (per curiam) ("While substance abuse is not a mitigating factor in attorney
discipline matters, it is a factor in determining the appropriate sanction."); In re Nida, _ S.C.
-, 432 S.E.2d 462, 463 (1993) (per curiam) (stating that the attorney's misconduct was
exacerbated by his failure or refusal to cooperate with the disciplinary Hearing Panel); In re
Dobson, _ S.C. _, 427 S.E.2d 166, 169 (1993) (per curiam) (consideringthe passageof time
between the offense and disciplinary proceeding in assessing sanction against attorney).
52. Cf. Payne v. Holiday Towers, Inc. 283 S.C. 210, 216, 321 S.E.2d 179, 182 (Ct. App.
1984) ("'Actual damages' or 'compensatory damages' are damages in satisfaction of, or in
recompense for, loss or injury sustained.") (citing Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388,
134 S.E.2d 206 (1964)).
53. The Preamble to the South Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct states:
Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in the Rules of
Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law. However, a lawyer
is also guided by personal conscience and the approbation of professional peers. A
lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the
legal profession and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals of public service.
S.C. App. CT. R. 407, Preamble.
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certain conduct, the Rules also serve to encourage attorneys to continually
strive to achieve the highest standards in both their professional and personal
endeavors. 4 The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that attorneys are
subject to discipline for matters that are not strictly related to the practice of
law.55 Therefore, the Rules serve a purpose that extends far beyond the issue
of competence in the practice of law. For this additional reason, the Rules
should not be used to define the standard of due care at issue in a civil suit for
legal malpractice. 6
IV. BREACH OF THE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACT
Plaintiffs in legal malpractice actions have sometimes sought to hold
attorneys liable under various statutes. One of the statutes most commonly
used for this purpose is the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act
(SCUTPA). s7 The SCUTPA provides for the recovery of attorney fees and,
in cases involving willful or knowing violations, treble damages. 8 Conse-
quently, it is not difficult to understand why plaintiffs often include SCUTPA
claims in legal malpractice actions. Despite the popularity of SCUTPA
claims, however, the viability of such a claim in a legal malpractice case is
extremely questionable.
A cause of action under the SCUTPA must allege facts that show unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce 9 that
adversely affect "the public interest."' An unfair or deceptive act or
54. Id. The Preamble further states: "A lawyer's conduct should conform to the requirements
of the law, both in professional service to clients and in the lawyer's business and personal
affairs." Id.
55. In re Tedder, 296 S.C. 500, 503, 374 S.E.2d 294, 296 (1988) (per curiam) (citing South
Carolina Real Estate Comm'n v. Boineau, 267 S.C. 574, 230 S.E.2d 440 (1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 954 (1977)). In Tedder the court held that the attorney's convictions for, among other
things, conspiracy to import marijuana, warranted disbarment. Id.
56. The Rules may also be viewed as too vague to stand as the basis for the legal standard of
care. Robert Dahlquist, The Code of Professional Responsibility and Civil Damage Actions
Against Attorneys, 9 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 20 (1982).
57. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-5-10 to -325 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1993). The operative
provision of the SCUTPA states: "Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful." Id. § 39-5-
20(a) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
58. Id. § 39-5-140(a).
59. The SCUTPA defines the terms "trade" and "commerce" as follows:
"Trade" and "commerce" shall include the advertising, offering for sale, sale
or distributionof any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal
or mixed, and any other article, commodity or thing of value wherever situate, and
shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this
State.
Id. § 39-5-10(b).
60. Noack Enters., Inc. v. Country Comer Interiors, Inc., 290 S.C. 475, 479, 351 S.E.2d
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practice that affects only the parties to a particular transaction does not involve
the public interest and therefore falls outside the scope of the SCUTPA. 61
To affect the public interest, the alleged acts or practices must have the
potential for repetition.62
To date, only one reported decision in South Carolina has addressed legal
services within the context of the SCUTPA. In Camp v. Springs Mortgage
Corp.63 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that there was "no question
but what [sic] legal services come within the definition of [the] statute."'
However, in making this statement the court of appeals appears to have
transposed the parties to the case, leaving the statement questionable. Plaintiff
Camp, an attorney, sued Springs Mortgage Corporation under the SCUTPA
after Springs informed Camp's client that Camp's services as the client's
counsel in a loan closing would be unacceptable, and the client obtained new
counsel. 5 Springs argued that its business was regulated and, therefore, it
was not within the scope of the SCUTPA.6 However, the court of appeals
rejected Spring's argument stating:
S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-10 (1976) defines "commerce" as including "the
advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution of any services.. .."
There is no question but what [sic] legal services come within the
definition of this statute. We also hold that the alleged act or practice of
Springs in this case would have an impact upon the public interest.67
The commerce at issue in Camp involved the mortgage services offered
347, 350 (Ct.App. 1986).
61. Ardis v. Cox, _ S.C. _, _, 431 S.E.2d 267, 271 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Noack,
290 S.C. 475, 351 S.E.2d 347).
62. Id. In Ardis the South Carolina Supreme Court stated:
The SCUTPA is unavailable to redress private wrongs if the public interest is
unaffected. An unfair or deceptive act or practice that affects only the parties to a
trade or a commercial transaction is beyond the Act's embrace. Unfair or deceptive
acts or practices have the potential for repetition. A deliberate or intentional breach
of a valid contract, without more, does not constitute a violation of the SCUTPA.
Otherwise, every intentional breach of a contract within a commercial setting would
constitute an unfair trade practice and thereby subject the breaching party to treble
damages.
Id. (citations omitted).
63. 307 S.C. 283, 414 S.E.2d 784 (Ct. App. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, _ S.C.
_ ,426 S.E.2d 304 (1993); see infra text accompanying notes 70-71 (discussing the supreme
court's reversal).
64. 307 S.C. at 285, 414 S.E.2d at 786.
65. Id. at 284, 414 S.E.2d at 785.
66. Id. at 285, 414 S.E.2d at 786.
67. Id. (citing Noack Enters. Inc. v. Country Comer Interiors, Inc., 290 S.C. 475, 479, 351
S.E.2d 347, 350 (Ct. App. 1986)).
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by Springs, not the legal services offered by Camp. Although Camp claimed
that Springs had interfered with his right to provide legal services,6" he made
no claim that Springs itself had provided any legal services to the client. In
fact, the opinion states that the client simply employed another attorney of her
choice after Springs rejected Camp as the closing attorney.69 Therefore, the
validity of the court's statement that legal services fall within the SCUTPA is
doubtful.
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' finding
that Camp had properly asserted an unfair trade practices claim.7" The
supreme court rejected the unfair trade practices claim on the grounds that
Spring's conduct in precluding Camp from acting as the closing attorney did
not describe any action that was unfair or deceptive for purposes of the
SCUTPA.71 Although the supreme court did not expressly address the court
of appeals's statement that legal services fall within the scope of the SCUTPA,
its reversal of the SCUTPA claim at least implies that the supreme court
disagreed with the court of appeals's finding in that regard.
Despite the lack of any substantive case law in South Carolina, some
insight into the validity of claims against attorneys under the SCUTPA can be
gained by reference to cases interpreting section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.' Section 39-5-20 of the SCUTPA, which declares unfair
trade practices unlawful, was modeled on section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Act.73
When construing section 39-5-20 of the SCUTPA, the code expressly instructs
the South Carolina courts to seek guidance from the Federal Trade Commis-
sion and federal court decisions construing section 5(a)(1) of the Federal
Act.74 Nevertheless, there is an important distinction between the SCUTPA
and the federal act: no private right of action exists under the federal act;
instead, the right to enforce the Federal Act rests solely with the Federal Trade
Commission.75
There have been very few claims presented against attorneys under the
Federal Act, which may indicate that the Federal Trade Commission has
determined that the Act, with limited exceptions, does not apply to attorneys.
For example, in Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
68. See Camp v. Springs Mortgage Corp., 307 S.C. 283, 284, 414 S.E.2d at 784, 785.
69. Id.
70. Camp v. Springs Mortgage Corp., _ S.C. _, 426 S.E.2d 304 (1993).
71. Id. at _, 426 S.E.2d at 306.
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-58 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
73. See generally N. Heyward Clarkson, III, Note, Consumer Protection and the Proposed
"South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act," 22 S.C. L. REV. 767, 782-87 (1970) (discussing
the history of the SCUTPA).
74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985).
75. E.g., Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 280 (9th Cir. 1973).
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Ass'n 76 the United States Supreme Court held that a group of approximately
one hundred attorneys who had entered into an agreement not to accept court
appointments to represent indigent criminal defendants because of an ongoing
fee dispute with the government had violated both the Sherman Antitrust Act
and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 7 In so doing, the Court
stated that the actions of the attorneys "was unquestionably a naked restraint
on [trade]. "78 In an earlier case, In re Wilson Chemical Co.,' the Federal
Trade Commission determined that an attorney who participated with a
manufacturer in a scheme to recruit children as sales agents had violated
section 5 of the Federal Trade Practices Act by allowing the manufacturer to
send out collection letters on the attorney's letterhead to both children and
adults who had failed either to pay for or return the manufacturer's prod-
ucts.80
The facts involved in both Superior Court Trial Lawyer's Ass'n and
Wilson Chemical are unusual. Therefore, it is unlikely that either of these
decisions would have any application to cases brought under the SCUTPA.
A review of case law from other jurisdictions with unfair trade practices
acts similar to the SCUTPA indicates that courts in those jurisdictions have
generally allowed plaintiffs to pursue unfair trade practice claims against
attorneys only if the allegations involve either the "commercial" or "entrepre-
neurial""1 aspects of an attorney's practice, such as advertisingr2 and fee
setting. 3 Such claims have been allowed because those activities are seen as
constituting "trade" or "commerce" for purposes of unfair trade practices
liability.' Outside of the commercial setting, most state courts have declined
to allow unfair trade practices claims against attorneys."
76. 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
77. See id. at 422-23.
78. Id. at 423.
79. 64 F.T.C. 168 (1964).
80. Id. at 186-87.
81. Quinn v. Connelly, 821 P.2d 1256, 1261 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (holding only the
entrepreneurial aspects of legal practice could sustain an action under Washington's Consumer
Protection Act).
82. Reed v. Allison & Perrone, 376 So. 2d 1067, 1068-69 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (noting that
advertising of legal services is clearly a "trade" or "commerce" subject to the provisions of the
Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law).
83. Short v. Demopolis, 691 P.2d 163, 168 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (holding that business
aspects of the legal profession such as setting, billing, and collecting legal fees are subject to the
state's consumer protection act).
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Frahm v. Urkovich, 447 N.E.2d 1007, 1011 (111. Ct. App. 1983) (holding the
Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act does not include the actual practice
of law and is not available as an additional remedy to redress a purely private wrong), superseded
by statute, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 270(a) (Supp. 1992). Indeed, some courts have
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In South Carolina most malpractice claims do not involve facts sufficient
to satisfy the statutory requirements of the SCUTPA. Allegations of mere
attorney negligence appear to fall outside of the Act. In Clarkson v. Orkin
Exterminating Co.86 the Fourth Circuit stated "[t]here is no support in South
Carolina law for the proposition that a service person violates the unfair trade
practice statute if he performs his job poorly or overlooks something which
should have attracted his attention."' In addition, most transactions
involving substantive legal services are limited in scope,"8 and any error or
omission by the attorney in the performance of those services is unlikely to
have the potential for repetition as required by the SCUTPA. Only in rare
instances could a good faith argument be made that an attorney's actions in a
particular case affected the public interest. Consequently, there appears to be
no legal basis for sustaining an unfair trade practices act claim in most legal
malpractice suits.
V. CIVIL CONSPIRACY
Civil conspiracy is emerging as one of the most frequently used and most
commonly abused theories in legal malpractice cases. The recent decision by
the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Mendelsohn v. Whizfeld89 provides
an illustration of how conspiracy claims are often inappropriately alleged in
attorney malpractice actions.
In Mendelsohn the defendant attorney sued his client in contract to collect.
attorney's fees arising from his representation of the client in a divorce
action.' The client counter-claimed, alleging in part that the attorney had
committed professional malpractice while representing him and included in the
held that unfair trade practices acts do not apply even in cases involving fee disputes. See, e.g.,
Ivey, Barnum & O'Mara v. Indian Harbor Properties, Inc., 461 A.2d 1369, 1372-73 (Conn,
1983) (holding the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act does not afford relief for purely
private dispute over attorney's fees), superseded by statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-
110g(a) (West 1992).
86. 761 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1985).
87. Id. at 191.
88. Examples of limited legal practice areas include: real estate, plaintiffs personal injury,
estate, and family law, which collectively generate approximately 63% of malpractice claims
presented against attorneys nationwide. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LAWYERS' PROFESSION-
AL LIABILITY, PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE: A STATISTICAL STUDY OF DETERMINATIVE
CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS ASSERTED AGAINST ATTORNEYS 8 (1986). The data reported in
this profile was a compilation of 29,227 claims reported to the National Legal Malpractice Data
Center of American Bar Association from January 1, 1983 through September 30, 1985. Id. at
3.
89. -_ S.C. _, 430 S.E.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1993), aff'd andnzodiedon othergrounds,_
S.C. _., 439 S.E.2d 845 (1994).
90. Id. at _, 430 S.E.2d at 526.
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counter-claim a cause of action for conspiracy. 9'
In the conspiracy cause of action, the client alleged that his attorney had
agreed, without authority, to allow the client's former wife to have temporary
child custody and that the attorney had committed a number of strategic and
procedural errors at trial.' The trial court directed a verdict against the
client on the conspiracy claim, and the court of appeals affirmed, stating:
Even if [the alleged] facts could be proven, they merely show
Mendelsohn, individually, did or did not do certain things that arguably
prejudiced Whitfield's divorce case. They do not give rise to a reasonable
inference that Mendelsohn combined with other persons for the purpose
of injuring Whitfield. Neither do they support a reasonable inference,
standing by themselves, that the acts and omissions were designed
"wilfully to injure" Whitfield. Whitfield suggests no other evidence from
which either a combination or wilfulness could be inferred, nor are we
aware of any from our review of the record.93
The fact pattern presented in Mendelsohn is typical of conspiracy claims
made against attorneys in South Carolina. In order to successfully plead civil
conspiracy, a claimant must allege three elements: "(1) a combination of two
or more persons, (2) for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, (3) which causes
him special damages."' In most cases, however, plaintiffs simply "tack on"
a conspiracy claim to their other causes of action without alleging all of the
necessary elements. In many cases, the damages caused by the attorney's
alleged tortious act are merely incorporated into the cause of action for
conspiracy. Such incorporation fails to satisfy the pleading requirement of
special damages. 95 In order to recover, the alleged damages must arise from
an overt act taken in furtherance of the conspiracy itself.96
A conspiracy claim subjects the conspirators to joint and several liability
91. Id. at __, 430 S.E.2d at 526.
92. Id. at , 430 S.E.2d at 529.
93. Id. at __, 430 S.E.2d at 529-30 (citations omitted).
94. Lee v. Chesterfield Gen. Hosp., Inc., 289 S.C. 6, 10, 344 S.E.2d 379, 382 (Ct. App.
1986).
95. See, e.g., Vaught v. Waites, 300 S.C. 201, 208-09, 387 S.E.2d 91, 95 (Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that the plaintiff's conspiracy action was barred because no special damages were alleged
aside from the damages sought under a breach of contract cause of action); Todd v. South
Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 276 S.C. 284, 293, 278 S.E.2d 607, 611 (1981) ("Where
the particular acts charged as a conspiracy are the same as those relied on as the tortious act or
actionable wrong, plaintiff cannot recover damages for such act or wrong, and recover likewise
on the conspiracy to do the act or wrong.") (quoting 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 33, at 719 (1967)),
vacated on other grounds, 287 S.C. 190, 336 S.E.2d 472 (1985).
96. Lee, 289 S.C. at 10, 344 S.E.2d at 382 ("The gravamen of the tort is the damage
resulting to the plaintiff from an overt act done pursuant to the combination. .... ").
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for damages arising from the conspiracy.' This joint and several liability
may explain why the cause of action is often included in legal malpractice
lawsuits. Attorneys become the target defendants because of the presumed
presence of professional liability insurance.
Even if properly pleaded, a conspiracy claim against an attorney should
fail in most cases. Negligent conduct by an attorney cannot serve as the basis
for conspiracy liability because the law does not recognize "conspiracy to
commit negligence. "98
Given the inherent problems in presenting a conspiracy claim against an
attorney, a claimant should carefully consider whether all three elements of
conspiracy are present before asserting the claim. To do otherwise may
subject the claimant himself to sanctions or civil liability for filing a baseless
pleading.
VI. ABUSIVE LITIGATION
Although the privity requirement poses a hurdle to most third-party
actions against attorneys, privity is not a bar in abuse of process and malicious
prosecution cases. For that reason, third parties often assert abuse of process
and malicious prosecution claims in malpractice actions against opposing
counsel. Such claims, however, are rarely successful.
A. Abuse of Process
To recover in an action for abuse of process, a plaintiff must show: "(1)
an ulterior purpose, and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper
in the regular conduct of the proceedings."" In Huggins v. Winn-Dixie
Greenville, Inc.' the South Carolina Supreme Court explained this cause
of action as follows:
Some definite act or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an
objective not legitimate in the use of the process, is required; and there is
97. See generally 16 AM. JUR. 2D Conspiracy § 56 (1979) (discussing the nature and extent
of liability); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 46, at
323 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing concerted action of joint tortfeasors).
98. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1012 (D.S.C. 1981) ("There is no such
thing as a conspiracy to commit negligence or, more precisely, to fail to exercise due care.").
99. Broadmoor Apartments v. Horwitz, 306 S.C. 482, 486, 413 S.E.2d 9, 11 (1991) (citing
Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 249 S.C. 206, 153 S.E.2d 693 (1967)); accord Rycroft
v. Gaddy, 281 S.C. 119, 125, 314 S.E.2d 39,43 (Ct. App. 1984) (also citingHuggins); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1977) (stating an alternative formulation of the
elements for abuse of process).
100. 249 S.C. 206, 153 S.E.2d 693 (1967).
[Vol. 45:851
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 10
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol45/iss4/10
THEORIES OF ATTORNEY LIABILITY
no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the
process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions. The
improper purpose usually takes the form of coercion to obtain a collateral
advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself, such as the
surrender of property or the payment of money, by the use of the process
as a threat or club. There is, in other words, a form of extortion, and it
is what is done in the course of negotiation, rather than the issuance of
any formal use of the process itself, which constitutes the tort.
10'
Persons who advise or consent to the unlawful acts are liable with the
actor as joint tortfeasors.' 2 Therefore, an attorney who knowingly partici-
pates in or assists a client's efforts to extort or coerce some object not
contemplated by the process can be held liable as a joint tortfeasor for any
resulting damages. Cases involving such egregious behavior by attorneys are
rare, and there are no reported cases in South Carolina involving the
successful presentation of an abuse of process claim against an attorney. 103
B. Malicious Prosecution
To recover in an action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must
show: "(1) the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings; (2)
by or at the instance of the defendant; (3) termination of such proceedings in
plaintiff's favor; (4) malice in instituting such proceedings; (5) lack of
probable cause; and (6) resulting injury or damage.""4 The elements of the
presence of malice and the absence of probable cause lie at the heart of this
cause of action. Malice is "the deliberate intentional doing of a wrongful act
without just cause or excuse.""05 A lack of probable cause exists "if the
circumstances are such as to satisfy a reasonable man that the defendant had
101. Id. at 209, 153 S.E.2d at 694 (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw
OF TORTS § 100, at 668-69 (2d ed. 1955)); see also Ransome v. Mimms, 320 F. Supp. 1110,
1114 (D.S.C. 1971) ("The evil aimed at in the cause of action is the use of the process to gain
a collateral advantage not contemplated by the process. The process must be used to coerce or
extort some object not within its scope.").
102. See Broadmoor Apartments, 306 S.C. at 486, 413 S.E.2d at 11 ("As a general rule,
liability for an abuse of process extends to all who knowingly participate, aid, or abet in the
abuse.").
103. Cf. Rycroft v. Gaddy, 281 S.C. 119, 314 S.E.2d 39 (1984) (affirming the trial court's
dismissal of plaintiff's claim that the opposing attorney had committed an abuse of process by
serving a subpoena for production of records).
104. Eaves v. Broad River Elec. Coop., 277 S.C. 475, 477, 289 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1982)
(citing Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 143 S.E.2d 607 (1965)); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977) (giving the Restatement formulation of the tort
of wrongful use of civil proceedings.).
105. Eaves, 277 S.C. at 479, 289 S.E.2d at 416 (quoting Margolis v. Telech, 239 S.C. 232,
238, 122 S.E.2d 417, 419-20 (1961)).
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no grounds for proceeding but his desire to injure the plaintiff." 6
However, if a defendant's actions are supported by probable cause, then the
defendant cannot be liable for malicious prosecution even if the plaintiff proves
malice.'0 7
In Gaar v. North Myrtle Beach Realty Co.' the South Carolina Court
of Appeals limited the availability of malicious prosecution actions against
attorneys. 19 The plaintiffs in Gaar sued two attorneys for malicious
prosecution after an action instituted by the attorneys against the plaintiffs
terminated in an involuntary nonsuit.1"o The trial court granted the attor-
neys' motion for summary judgment because it found no genuine issue of
material fact concerning whether the attorneys had probable cause to assert the
claim filed on behalf of their client in the underlying lawsuit."' The court
of appeals affirmed," 2 stating:
In our opinion, the better rule is that an attorney is immune from
liability to third persons arising from the performance of his professional
activities as an attorney on behalf of and with the knowledge of his client.
Accordingly, an attorney who acts in good faith with the authority of his
client is not liable to a third party in an action for malicious prosecu-
tion.
113
106. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Malicious Prosecution § 52 (1970). Conversely, probable cause exists
if a reasonable person would have believed and acted the same under the same circumstances.
"In determining the existence of probable cause, the facts must be 'regarded from the point of
view of the party prosecuting; the question is not what the actual facts were, but what he honestly
believed them to be.'" Eaves, 277 S.C. at 478, 289 S.E.2d at 416 (quoting 54 C.J.S. Malicious
Prosecution § 20 (1948)). While malice may be inferred from a lack of probable cause, a lack
of probable cause cannot be inferred from any degree of malice. Parrott, 246 S.C. at 322, 143
S.E.2d at 609 (citing Stoddard v. Roland, 31 S.C. 342, 9 S.E. 1027 (1889), and Brown v.
Bailey, 215 S.C. 175, 54 S.E.2d 769 (1949)).
107. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Malicious Prosecution § 50 (1970).
108. 287 S.C. 525, 339 S.E.2d 887 (Ct. App. 1986).
109. Id. at 529,339 S.E.2d at 889; see also Wigg v. Simonton, 46 S.C.L. (12 Rich.) 583, 592
(1860) ("inhere is no doubt that an attorney for an act done, bonafide, as a professional man,
is not responsible [to adverse parties].").
110. Gaar, 287 S.C. at 527, 339 S.E.2d at 888.
111. Id. at 527-28, 339 S.E.2d at 888.
112. The court noted that one of the plaintiffs admitted that no evidence existed that "the
attorneys acted for any purpose other than to secure compensation they believed was due to their
client." Gaar, 287 S.C. at 529, 339 S.E.2d at 889. Further, no evidence existed that the
attorneys had been "activated by personal or malicious motives." Id. Finally, the court found
that the attorneys had been acting in their capacity as attorneys in pursuing the underlying action
and that they had not become parties to the lawsuit. Id.
113. Id. at 528-29, 339 S.E.2d at 889. The court noted that this rule does not leave plaintiffs
without a remedy. Id. at 530, 339 S.E.2d at 890. "Such a suit is properly brought against the
party to the original action, not the attorney representing him." Id. at 529, 339 S.E.2d at 889.
However, the attorney might still be indirectly liable because "[a] client subjected to a malicious
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The court explained that the policy behind its decision was to allow
attorneys to advise their clients freely without the fear of a harassing lawsuit
by the opposing party."1 4 In support of that position, the court noted that an
attorney has an obligation to pursue zealously a client's lawful claim and may
be liable in malpractice for failing properly to assert and protect his client's
rights 15 The court found that to permit opposing parties to sue an attorney
for malicious prosecution "would create a conflict of interest with the
attorney's obligation to properly represent and support his client. "116
According to the court, the potential exposure to such lawsuits might inhibit
the creativity of attorneys in pursuing new causes of action, thereby hindering
the development of the common law."'
A malicious prosecution claim is still available in cases when an attorney
initiates litigation in bad faith. Much like claims for abuse of process and
conspiracy, however, the burden of proof for a malicious prosecution is a
stringent one. As Gaar illustrates, claims against attorneys for malicious
prosecution are not favored in South Carolina, and a malicious prosecution
claim should not be brought absent evidence of bad faith by the attorney.
C. Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act
The South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act,"'
passed by the South Carolina legislature in 1988, creates a statutory claim that
merges certain elements of the common law causes of action for malicious
prosecution and abuse of process. 19 The Act provides:
Any person who takes part in the procurement, initiation, continua-
prosecution suit may be able to sue his attorney for legal malpractice if the attorney negligently
files an unwarranted claim." Id. at 530, 339 S.E.2d at 890.
114. Id. at 529, 339 S.E.2d at 889 (citing Peck v. Chouteau, 3 S.W. 577 (Mo. 1887)).
115. Id. at 529, 339 S.E.2d at 889-90.
116. Id. at 529-30, 339 S.E.2d at 890 (citing Junot v. Lee, 372 So. 2d 707 (La. Ct. App.
1979), and W.D.G., Inc. v. Mutual Mfg. & Supply Co., 5 Ohio Op. 3d 397 (1976)).
117, Garr, 287 S.C. at 530, 339 S.E.2d at 890 (citing Central Florida Mach. Co. v. Williams,
424 So. 2d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)). Despite this concern, however, the court noted that
this case was the first decision reported in South Carolina addressing an attorney's liability for
malicious prosecution. Id. at 528, 339 S.E.2d at 889.
118. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-36-10 to -50 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
119. Like an action for malicious prosecution, the Act requires the prior proceeding to
terminate in the claimant's favor. The Act also addresses the use of process for something other
than a "proper" purpose, S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-36-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp 1993), which has
overtones of an action for abuse of process. It is interesting to note that in 1989, the Georgia
legislature created a statutory claim for "abusive litigation" that represents a merger of the torts
of malicious prosecutionand abuse of process. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-7-80 to -85 (Michie Supp.
1993). In fact, the Georgia Act provides the exclusive remedy for "abusive litigation," replacing
the torts of malicious use of civil proceedings (malicious prosecution) and malicious abuse of civil
process (abuse of process). Id. § 51-7-85.
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tion, or defense of, any civil proceeding is subject to being assessed for
payment of all or a portion of the attorney's fees and court costs of the
other party if:
(1) he does so primarily for a purpose other than that of securing
the proper discovery, joinder of parties, or adjudication of the claim
upon which the proceedings are based; and
(2) the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person seeking
an assessment of the fees and costs.'
The Act applies to any person who takes part in the initiation or
maintenance of the frivolous proceeding and specifically addresses the potential
liability of an attorney.'21 The Act presumes that an attorney has acted for
a "proper purpose" whenever the attorney believes in "good faith" that the
litigation is not being used to "merely harass or injure the other party.""
The terms "proper purpose" and "good faith" are not defined in the Act.
Both terms, however, do appear in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("proper purpose" appears in its negative form, "improper
purpose").'" In addition, both the Act and Federal Rule 11 specifically
state that the use of litigation to "harass" the opposing party constitutes an
120. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-36-10 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993)
121. Id. § 15-36-20. Section 15-36-20 provides in pertinent part:
Any person who takes part in the procurement, initiation, continuation, or
defense of civil proceedings must be considered to have acted to secure a proper
purpose as stated in item (1) of Section 15-36-10 if he reasonably believes in the
existence of the facts upon which his claim is based and
(3) believes, as an attorney of record, in good faith that his procurement,
initiation, continuation, or defense of a civil cause is not intended to merely
harass or injure the other party.
122. Id. The use of the modifier "merely" indicates that an incidental intent to harass or injure
may not be actionable.
123. Federal Rule 11 provides in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer..
that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,
and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. . . . If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed
it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
[Vol. 45:851
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"improper purpose." 2 4 The similarity in terms suggests that Federal Rule
11 was the inspiration for the operative provisions of the Act. In fact, the Act
may represent an attempt to incorporate into state practice the requirements of
Federal Rule 11, which are more stringent than the requirements under Rule
11 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure."Z Because many of the
terms used in the Act also appear in Federal Rule 11, the South Carolina
courts may look to decisions interpreting the Federal Rule to determine what
constitutes a proper purpose and good faith'26 with respect to potential
liability of attorneys under the Act. The majority of courts addressing the
good faith requirement of Federal Rule 11 have applied an objective
standard,'27 which requires a showing of "reasonableness under the circum-
124. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 11 with S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-36-20(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1993).
125. Rule 11 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay.
... If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this Rule,
the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
S.C. R. Civ. P. 11(a). At the time the Frivolous Proceedings Act was enacted in 1988,
the latter part of Rule 11(a) above read:
If a pleading, motion or other paper is not signed or is signed with intent
to defeat the purpose of this Rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and
the action may proceed as though the pleading, motion or paper had not
been served. For a willful violation of this Rule an attorney may be
subject to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if
scandalous or indecent material is asserted.
S.C. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (superseded). This language was deleted by a July 1, 1989
amendment to the Rule. The Reporter's Notes to the 1989 amendments state: "The change makes
clear that the court may impose sanctions for violations of this Rule and replaces the ambiguous
languagethat 'an attorney may be subject to appropriate disciplinary action.' The change is more
consistent with the language on sanctions for discovery abuse."
126. In the context of pleading requirements, the South Carolina courts have traditionally
referred to good faith as simply the absence of bad faith. See e.g., Burkhalter v. Townsend, 139
S.C. 324, 331, 138 S.E. 34, 36 (1927). Black's Law Dictionary defines good faith as "an
intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it
encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of
design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage.. . ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 693
(6th ed. 1990).
127. 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1335, at 59 (2d ed. 1990).
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stances." 28  The improper purpose requirement has also been interpreted
under an objective standard. 1
29
To date, the Act has been discussed in only one reported decision. In
Kilcawley v. Kilcawley30 the family court granted the husband attorney's
fees against his wife under the Act after she moved to reopen their divorce
decree and then attempted to dismiss her motion.t The court of appeals
affirmed the award, stating that the wife's attorney had filed the motion to
reopen "without conducting any investigation" regarding the wife's claims and
referenced Rule 11(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.3 2
The court also agreed with the family court's finding that the wife's primary
purpose for initiating the motion was "other than that of securing proper
adjudication of the claim."133 The court concluded that the facts illustrated
the "improvident and unreasonable nature" of the wife's claims, allowing the
trial court to award attorney's fees under the Act. 
14
The South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions Act is a
valuable tool that affords direct relief under appropriate circumstances. The
Act is not duplicative of malicious prosecution or abuse of process claims. As
distinct causes of action, claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process
would normally go to a fact-finder for resolution only after conclusion of the
discovery process, with the attendant time and cost borne by the aggrieved
party. Under the Act, the aggrieved party may move the court by motion for
a determination of liability and damages, 35 saving judicial resources by
allowing the trial court to hear and dispose of the motion based on its review
of the proceedings.' 36 The Act also differs from Rule 11 because it allows
128. Id; see also Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters. 498 U.S. 533
(1991) (citing the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
129. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 127, § 1335, at 85.
130. Kilcawley v. Kilcawley, _ S.C. __, 440 S.E.2d 892 (Ct. App. 1994). The court noted
the availability of this statutory remedy to combat a frivolous lawsuit in Spencer v. Barnwell
County Hospital (S.C. Ct. App. Op. No. 2186, Adv. Sh. #12, 1994).
131. Id. at __, 440 S.E.2d at 893.
132. Id. at & n.2, 440 S.E.2d at 893 & n.2.
133. Id. at __,440 S.E.2d at 894.
134. Id. at __, 440 S.E.2d at 894.
135. Section 15-36-30 states:
When the essential elements of this chapter have been established as provided in
Section 15-36-10, a person is entitled to recover his attorney's fees and court costs
reasonably incurred in litigating the proceedings. The entitlement of the aggrieved person
must be determined by the trial judge at the conclusion of a trial upon motion of the
aggrieved party stating the manner in which the other party is alleged to have acted in
violation of this statute. The court shall base its decision upon a review of the proceedings
and affidavits submitted by each person affected.
S.C. Code Ann. § 15-36-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
136. Upon appellate review, the court may take its own view of the preponderance of the
[Vol. 45:851
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for recovery of costs as well as fees.
The South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Act allows trial courts
to put teeth into a fundamental principal of law: the use of the judicial process
only for legitimate ends. Although the Act may be used against attorneys as
well as litigants, the Act can also be invoked by attorneys in response to
unfounded legal malpractice actions.
VII. CONCLUSION
South Carolina law continues to require traditional pleading and proof
elements in legal malpractice actions. Therefore, privity serves to define the
potential remedies that may be available to a given claimant. Under the rules
of privity, a negligence cause of action may be presented by both the client
and those in privity with the client, whereas a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty may be brought only by the client or by a party satisfying the criteria set
forth in Hotz v. Minyard.137
Third parties still may pursue common law claims that do not require
privity, such as conspiracy, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution.
However, those causes of action are difficult to prove and rarely result in an
award of damages. The South Carolina Frivolous Civil Proceedings Sanctions
Act may provide a more cost effective alternative to abuse of process and
malicious prosecution actions.
The validity of an attorney malpractice claim under the South Carolina
Unfair Trade Practices Act is suspect. Other jurisdictions have limited
attorney liability for unfair trade practices to claims arising out of the
commercial or entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of law. The reasoning
employed by those courts appears equally sound under the provisions of the
South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act.
Finally, regardless of the theory of liability chosen, the South Carolina
Rules of Professional Conduct should not serve to establish an attorney's duty
of care in a legal malpractice action. The Rules properly apply only to
attorney disciplinary matters. An attorney's actions in a legal malpractice case
should be judged according to the standard of care developed for that purpose
at common law.
evidence because the trial court's determination is treated as one in equity. See Kilcawley v.
Kilcawley, _ S.C. _, _, 440 S.E.2d 892, 893 (Ct. App. 1994).
137. 304 S.C. 225, 403 S.E.2d 634 (1991).
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